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356 MALLOY tI. FONG 
[So F. NOB. 18230, 18231. In Bank. June 1, 1951.] 
CLINTON MALLOY, a Minor, etc., Appellant, V. WILLIAM 
PETER FONG et a!., Respondents. 
[1] Oharities-Liability of Oharitable Institutions. - Charitable 
corporations are liable for their torts whether or not a par-
ticular plaintiff has paid for the charity received. 
[2] Religious Societies-Actions-Evidence. - In an action in 
which it is sought to charge a supervisory church body and 
the individuals conducting a Bible school in a local church for 
injuries suttered by plaintiff while attending the school, the 
jury properly concluded that the agents who conducted the 
school were the agents of the body, where an officer of the 
body testified that it exercised control of churches in the 
mission stage, where the pastor testified that the church was 
in the mission stage, and where the embryonic character of the 
church was further suggested by evidence that it was nt}'W and 
only partially self-supporting, and that the body had the 
power of selection and removal of the pastor who was respon-
sible to and a member of the body. 
[3] Id.-Liability.-The rule of f'e8pOnaeaf 8uperior applies to 
ecclesiastical bodies. 
[4] Independent Oontractors-Existence of Relationship-Right 
of OontroL-Whether a person performing work for another 
is an agent or an independent contractor depends primarily on 
whether the one for whom the work is done has the legal right 
to control the activities of the alleged agent. 
[5] Id.-Existence of Relationship-Right to Terminate Services 
as Factor.-The right of one engaging the services of another 
immediately to terminate the services gives him a means of 
control inconsistent with a principal and independent con-
tractor relationship. 
[1] Liability of privately conducted charity for personal in-
juriel!, notes, 14 A.L.R. 572; 133 A.L.R. 821. See, also, 5 Oal.Jm. 
36; 10 Am.Jur. 691. 
[4] See 16 Oal.Jm. 960; 35 Am.Jur. 445. 
McK. Dig. References: [lJ Charities, § 42; [2, 7, 8] Religious 
Societies, § 18; [3] Religious Societies, § 12; [4, 6] Independent 
Contractors, § 3; [5] Independent Contractors, § 5; [9] Automo-
biles, § 159; [10] Religious S~ieties, § 12 [11] Agency, § 3; [12] 
Ar;ency, § 15; [13] Automobiles, § 243; [14] Religious Societies, 
§ 12; [15] Religious Societies, § 3; (16] Appeal and Error, § 1209a; 
[17-19] Automobiles, § 123(2); [20j Master and Servant, § 206; 
[21] Automobiles, § 316; [22] Automobiles, § 362-1. 
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[6] Id.-Existence of Relationship-Right of Control-It is not 
essential that the right of control be exercised or that there be 
actual supervision of the work of an agent. The existence of 
the right of control and supervision establishes the existence 
of an agency, as opposed to a principal and independent 
contractor relationship. 
[7] Religious Societies - Actions - Evidence. - Evidence that a 
church supervisory body bad the right to install and remove 
its ministers, to approve or disapprove their transfers to other 
jurisdictions, and to supervise and control the activities of its 
local churches, particularly those in the mission stage, supports 
the conclusion that the body had a sufficient right to control 
the activities of the pastor of a local embryonic church to 
establish an agency relationship. 
[8] Id. - Actions - Evidence. - A conclusion that such control 
existed as to establish an agency relationship betwecn a super-
vil'Iing church body and a local church pastor is reinforced by 
evidence that the pastor was engaged solely in his work with 
the church; that his work was subject to supervision by the 
supervising church body; that none of the duties performed 
by him were too complicated for efficient supervision by such 
church body; that the principal instrumentalities of his work 
were the property of the employer; that his employment was 
on an indefinite basis; that he was paid by the month; that all 
the activities of the church revolved around his office; and that 
at the time of employment neither he nor the supervising body 
gave any thought to the distinction between agent and 
independent contractor. 
[9] Automobiles-Persons Liable for Injuries.-In an action for 
personal injuries suflered in an automobile accident while 
plaintift' was being transported with others from a church to 
ncreational grounds as a part of a Bible school program, a 
finding of negligence on the part of the pastor in charge of the 
program is supported by eviden('!e that he permitted and par-
ticipated in a race between his automobile and that on which 
plaintift' was riding, forcing the other driver to enter an inter-
section on the wrong side of the street; thus causing the acci-
dent; or that he permitted plaintift' and others to ride on the 
running boards of the vehicles causing plaintift"s injury. 
[10] ReligiOUS Societies-Liabilit)'.-A church supervisory body 
is liable for injuries caused by the tort of its agent, a church 
pastor, acting within the scope of his agency. 
[11] AgenC)'-Existence-Creation.-An agency relationship may 
be informally created, neither particular words nor consider-
ation being required, but simply conduct by each party mani-
[11] See 1 CaJ.Jur. 694, 696; 2 Am.Jur. 23. 
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festing ac('eptance of a relationship whereby one of them is to 
perform work for the other under the latter's direction. 
[12] Id.-Existence-Evidence.-A finding of an agency relation-
ship between a church pastor and another is supported by evi-
dence that the other gratuitously assumed the pastor's respon-
sibility for the supervision and control of instruction and 
activities connected with a church Bible school during the 
illness of the pastor, that such participation was essential to 
the conduct of the school, and that he continued to perform 
duties in connection therewith under the supervision of the 
pastor after the latter's reassumption of authority. 
[13] Automobiles-Evidence-AgenCJ.-In an action for personal 
injuries suffered while plaintiff was being transported with 
others from a church to recreational grounds as a part of a 
Bible school program under the supervision of the church 
pastor as agent for a church supervisory body, evidence that 
the driver of the automobile on which plaintiff was riding 
performed duties for which the pastor was responsible, that 
his performance of those duties was subject to th..-pastor's 
supervision and control, and that the services could be ter-
minated by the pastor at any time, supports a conclusion that ~ 
the driver was a subagent acting within the scope of his 
agency at the time of the accident. 
[14] Religious Societies-Liability.-Where the pastor of a church, -
acting within the scope of his authority, as agent of a church 
supervisory body, in organizing and staffing a church Bible 
school program, appoints a subagent, the body is liable for the 
negligence of the subagent acting within the scope of his 
agency. (Civ. Code, §§ 2349, 2351.) 
[16] Id.-Organization-Incorporation.-In an action in which it 
is sought to charge a church supervisory body for the negli-
gence of a pastor of a church and another as the body's agents 
in conducting a church Bible school, it cannot be successfully 
urged that the corporation which has been made a defendant 
in the action was organized solely to hold property and is not 
the same as the religious entity which supervises the denom-
ination's churches and ministers, where the language of the 
preamble and purpose clauses of the articles of incorporation 
is broad enough to include supervision of religious activities 
and is simply 11 statement of the purposes of the supervisury 
body before as well as after incorporation. 
[16] Appeal-Presumptions-Orders on Motion for !few TriaL-
Where an order granting a new trial does not specify the 
ground on which it is made, it will be assumed on I1ppeal that 
the order is not based on insufficiency of the . evidence to 
support the verdict. 
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[17] Automobiles-Care as to Gnests-Who are Guests.-In deter-
mining whether Ii boy injured in an automobile driven by a 
divinity student to a playground during the recreation period 
. of a church Bible school was a guest or paid compensation 
for the ride, it is immaterial that the dIvinity student drove the 
car gratuitously; it is sufTIcient if the miuister of the church 
or the church or ecclesiastical body itself received a benefit 
from the boy's transportation to the playground. 
[18] ld.-Care as to Guests-Who Are Guests.-Evidence that 
transportation of children attending a church Bible school to a 
playground for the recreation period was an integral part of 
the school's program, that it was to the mutual benefit of the 
children and the church that the children attend the school, 
that the minister had a large number of handbills printed 
urging attendance at the school, and that the children had 
recently been released from secular schools for their summer 
vacation, supports an inference that the daily open-air recre-
ation periods were designed to and did induce parents to send 
their children to the school, and such inference negatives the 
theory that no compensation was given for the transportation 
during such recreation periods. 
[19] ld.-Care as to Guests-Who Are Guests.-Evidence that a 
boy attended a church Bible school financed in part by parents' 
contributions to the church and by their payments to defray 
expenses I incidental to the running of the school supports an 
inference that compensation was given for the boy's ride to a 
playground for physical recreation within the meaning of 
Veh. Code, § 403. 
[20] Master and Servant-Liability to Third Persons-Relation of 
Parties.-The doctrine of respondeat superior is not applicable 
to the relationship between a supervisor and his subordinate 
employees. 
[21] Automobiles-Instructions-Agent or Servant.-In an action 
for personal injuries sustained by a boy while in an automobile 
being driven by a divinity student to a playground during the 
recreation period of a church Bible school, it is error to 
instruct the jury that they might find the minister of the 
church liable for the divinity student's negligence on the 
theory that the doctrine of respondeat superior applies to the 
relationship between these two. 
[22] ld.-New Trial.-Where there is a substantial confbct in the 
evidence as to whether the minister of the church conducting 
a summer Bible school was himself negligent and liable for an 
accident to a boy while he was being transported by auto-
mobile to a playground during a recreation period of the 
school, and it cannot be determined whether the jury based 
its verdict against the minister on that ground or on an erro-
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DI.'OnS instruction that he could be found liable for the negli-
genc!' of 8 divinity student driving the automobile in which 
thc boy was riding, it is proper to grant the minister's motion 
for a new trial. 
APPEALS from part of a judgment of the Superior Court 
of the City and County of Sall Francisco and from an order 
granting a new trial. Sylvain J. Lazarus, Judge. Part of 
judgment appealed from, reversed with directions; order 
affirmed. 
Action for damages for personal injuries arising out of a 
collision of vehicles. Part of judgment denying a recovery 
against one defendant, reversed with directions. 
M. Mitchell Bourquin, Healy & Walcom, Jacobs, Blancken-
burg & May and John J. Healy for Appellant. 
Clarence A. Linn, Robert W. MacDonald, Dan H!}dsell, 
Roscoe D. Jones, Raymond L. Hanson, Cooley, Crowley & 
Gaither and Louis V. Crowley for Respondents. 
Raymond L. Hanson and Albert C. Agnew as Amici Curiae 
on behalf of Respondents. 
TRA YNOR, J .-Plaintiff brought this action for damages 
for personal injuries allegedly caused by the concurrent neg-
ligence of defendants Holmes, Fong, and Antisdale. Plain-
tiff alleged that Fong and Antisdale were acting as agents 
of defendant Presbytery of San Francisco. The jury exoner-
ated defendant Holmes, but returned a verdict in favor of 
plaintiff in the amount of $41,500 against defendants Fong, 
Antisdale, and the Presbytery of San Francisco. On motion 
of defendant Presbytery, the trial court entered a judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict as to it. Defendant Antisdale's 
motion for new trial was granted. Defendant Fong's motion 
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was denied. Plain-
tiff appeals from the order granting a new trial as to defend-
ant Antisdale and from that part of the judgment that denies 
recovery against the Presbytery. Defendant Fong has not 
appealed. 
During the summer vacation of 1943, plaintiff, then a boy of 
13, attended a vacation Bible school conducted at the San 
Mateo Presbyterian Church for thp children of members of 
the church, then a "mission" under the jurisdiction of de-
June 1951] MALLOY tI. FONG 
(37 C.2d 356; 231 P.2d :un 
361 
fClldant Presbytery of San Francisco. Defendant Antisdalc, 
pastor of the church, was in charge of the school and gave the 
Bible instruction. The Bible classes were supplemented by 
classes in arts and crafts and by supervised recreation at a 
nearby playground to wbich the children were taken in auto-
mobiles and from whicb they were returned to the church 
at the conclusion of the recreation period. 
Antisdale became ill several days before July 1, 1943, the 
day plaintiff was injured, and was unable to conduct the 
school. It was therefore left without effective supervision and 
without an instructor qualified to conduct the Bible classes. 
Defendant Fong, a 19-year-old divinity student, was at that 
time vacationing at the home of his guardian, Dr. Jones. a 
retired Presbyterian minister, in San Mateo. Fong agreed to 
conduct the Bible instruction in Antisdale's absence so that 
Antisdale might stay home and rest. In addition to conducting 
the Bible classes, Fong drove the children to the playground 
for their recreation period in his guardian's automobile, a 
Ford station wagon lent to him for that purpose. 
Antisdale returned to the church on the day of the accident, 
but he was occupied in his office the greater part of the morn-
ing, and Fo~ remained in charge of the dass. At the con-
clusion of the Bible instruction, Fong released the children 
to wait outside the church for transportation to the play-
ground for the recreation period. Antisdale emerged from 
his office to see the children climbing into Fong's station wagon 
and several boys, including plaintiff, standing on the running 
boards. Antisdale then informed the children that he would 
take some of them in his car to relieve the congestion in the 
station wagon, and several of them entered the back seat of 
his car. Two of the boys left Fong's station wagon and stood 
on the running boards of Antisdale's car. The other children 
remained in Fong's station wagon, plaintiff standing on the 
left running board and another boy standing on the right 
running board. Antisdale testified that he ordered the chil-
dren off the running boards. It is undisputed, however, that 
Antisdale did not insist on compliance with his order and that 
the children continued to stand on the running boards of his 
car and Fong's. 
The church was located on Twenty-fifth Avenue in San 
Mateo, a street running east and west; the playground to 
which the children were being taken was located on Twenty-
eighth A venue, severa] blocks wcst of the church. Twenty-
eighth A venue is intersected east of the playground by Isabelle 
) 
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A venUl', a street running north and south. The two vehicles 
IE.'ft for the playground, driving west on Twenty-fifth Avenue, 
Antisdale's car in the lead, closely followed by Fong's station 
wagon. They then turned south to Twenty-eighth Avenue and 
again beaded west toward the playground. During the trip 
the children in each vehicle werE.' shouting and challenging 
the children in the other vehicle to a race to the playground. 
Although the evidence is conflicting on this point, there is 
testimony that Fong and Antisdale entered into the spirit 
of the competition and increased the speed of their vehicles. 
After the vehicles turned west on Twenty-eighth Avenue, Fong 
pulled out to the left and endeavored to pass Antisdale, who 
increased the speed of his car to prevent Fong from passing. 
Fong pulled up parallel to Antisdale but was unable to pass 
him because Antisdale had increased his speed. Twenty-
eighth Avenue has only one lane for vehicular traffic proceed-
ing in each direction, so that Fong's station wagon during the 
time he W8.'l attempting to pass Antisdale was being" driven 
well over in the left-hand lane, almost to the opposite curb. 
The two vehicles approached the intersection of Twenty-eighth 
and Isabelle A venues in that position, Fong still unsuccess-
fully attempting to pass Antisdale. Antisdale stopped his car 
at the hitersection, but Fong proceeded out into the intersec-
tion at an excessive rate of speed, still on the left-hand side 
of the road. Defendant Holmes was driving her car north 
on Isabelle A venue and had just pulled out into the intersec-
tion when Fong drove by her. The vehicles were too close 
for her to stop in time and, according to her testimony, Fong 
made no effort to stop. Her right front fender and Fong's 
station wagon collided, striking plaintiff standing on the left 
running board. As a result of the collision, plaintiff lost his 
left leg below the knee and sustained injuries of a perma-
nently disabling nature to his ri~ht.leg, necessitating prolonged 
hospitalization and medical treatment. 
Plaintiff's complaint was in three counts. In the first count 
he alleged that Fong was the agent of Antisdale and the Pres-
bytery, that he was a passenger in Fong's car at the time of 
the accidE.'nt, and that the accident was caused by the concur-
rent nplZ1i~E'n('e of defendants Fong and Holmes. In the sec-
ond count he alleged that Antisdale was the agent of the 
PrC'sbytery, and that his negligence was a cause of the inju-
riC's to plaintiff in that he "negligently and carelessly in-
(,l'E'as!'u th(' speE.'d of his said Chevrolpt sedan automobile, 80 
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by Fong], in which plaintiff was riding, to pasR and return 
to th(' right side of the roadway, so that the two (2) vehicles 
ran abreast into the inters('etion of s:lid 28th Avenue with Isa-
belle A venue, proximately causing and precipitating a colli-
sion between said Ford Station Wagon in which plaintiff was 
riding and that Raid Chevrolet sedan automobilc being driven 
by defendant EI('anor Holmes." In the third count, plaintiff 
alleged that AntiRdale and Fong were negligent in failing to 
exercise proper care for the safety of the children for whom 
they were responsible in that t.hey negligently permitted sev-
eral of them, including plaintiff, to ride on the mnning boards 
of the two vehicles, and that such negligence was a proximate 
cause of plaintiff's injuries. 
Defendants Antisdale, Fong, and Holmes answered, denying 
negligence and pleading that plaintiff was contributively neg-
ligent. Defendant Presbytery denied that Fong was the agent 
of Antisdale, or that either of them was its agent, or that 
plaintiff was a passenger in Fong's station wagon. It pleaded 
three defenses: (1) that plaintiff was contributively negli-
gent; (2) that the sole cause of the accident wa."! the negligence 
of defendant Holmes; and (3) that it is a charitable corpo-
ration, engaged solely in the propagation of religion and "does 
not contemplate the distribution of gainR, profits or dividends 
to its members, and that at no time has it engaged in any ac-
tivity other than the propagation of religion. That this de-
fendant has at all times exercised due and reasonable care in 
the selection of its servants and agents." 
Plaintiff contends that there is substantial evidence to sup-
port the verdict of the jury, that there were neither errors 
of law nor irregularity in the proceedinJ!S at the trial, and 
that the trial court improperly granted defendants' motions 
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial. 
In support of the judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the 
Presbytery contends that, as a charitable corporation, it il!l 
not liable to nonpaying beneficiaries for the torts of its agents, 
and that, as a matter of law, neither Fong nor Antisdale were 
its agents at the time of the accident. In support of the or-
der granting a new trial, Antisdale contends that the trial 
court committed error in the giving of two instructions: one, 
that the jury could find against Antisdale if fhey fonnd that 
Fong was biR agent and was negligent; the other, that a ver-
dict might be returned against. Fonl! and al!ainst Antisdale 
as his principal, even though the jury found Fong guilty only 
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of ordinary or gross negligence, if it also found that plaintiff 
was a passenger and not a guest in Fong's station wagon . 
.Antisdale contends that, as a matter of law, Fong was not his 
agent and plaintiff was a guest in Fong's station wagon, and 
that the instructions were therefore prejudicially erroneous 
in that they submitted to the jury as a question of fact a 
matter that was one of law and •• at the least permitted the 
jury to find sucb a relation" when in fact none existed. 
(Edward.~ v. Freeman, 34 Ca1.2d 589, 594 [212 P.2d 883].) 
Plaintiff's Appeal from the Judgment for the 
Presbytery of San Francisco 
The Presbytery contends that, as a charitable corpora· 
tion, it is exempted from liability to nonpaying beneficiaries 
by the holding of this court in Thomas v. German General 
Benevolent Society, ]68 Cal. 183, 188 [141 P. 1186], that 
"where one accepts the benefit of a public or a private charity 
he exempts by implied contract the benefactor from IYtbility 
for the negligence of the servants in administering the char· 
ity, if the benefactor has used due care in the selection of 
those servants." (Lewis v. Young Men's Christian Assn., 
206 Cal. 115, 116 [273 P. 580] ; Bardinelli v. Church of All 
Nations,23 Cal.App.2d 713, 714-715 [73 P.2d 1264); Young 
v. Boy Scouts of America, 9 Cal.App.2d 760, 764 [51 P.2d 
1911; Ritchie v. Long Beach Com. Hospital Assn., 139 Cal. 
App. 688, 690 [34 P.2d 771) ; Stonaker v. Big Sisters Hospital, 
116 Cal.App. 375, 379 [2 P.2d 520] ; Hallinan v. Prindle, 17 
Cal.App.2d 656, 669 [62 P.2d 1075] ; Shane v. Hospital of the 
Good Samaritan, 2 Cal.App.2d 334, 335-340 [37 P.2d 1066]; 
ct. Phoenix Assurance Co. v. Salvation Army, 83 Cal.App. 
455,456,461·462 [256 P. 1106].) 
The theory of the Thomas case, however, was abandoned by 
this court in St1va v. Providence Hospital, 14 Ca1.2d 762, 775 
[97 P.2d 798), and England v. Hospital of the Good Samari-
tan, 14 Ca1.2d 791 [97 P.2d 813], for the reason that "the im· 
plied contract doctrine has been used to rationalize a result 
and is not based upon the intention of the parties, as legal 
principle requires." Those cases held that a charitable hospi· 
tal was liable to a paying patient for injuries resulting from 
the neg-ligence of a nurse. 
The Presbytery contends that the Silva and England cases 
are limited to the facts presented therein and do not require 
the complete abandonment of the doctrine of charitable im· 
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were paying patients of the defendant hospitals, thC' decisions 
therein state a rule applicable only to paying beneficiaries of 
the acth'ities of ebaritable corporations. It is contended that 
as to nonpaying recipients. of charity the rule of the Thomas 
case is still applicable. 
It is true, as the Presbytery asserts, that the plaintiffs 
in the Silva and England cases paid for the services they 
received. It does not follow, however, that the reasoning ap-
plied in those cases is limited to paying beneficiaries. The 
theories advanced by the earlier decisions or urged by the 
Presbytery in support of the partial retention of the doctrine 
of charitable immunity are as applicable to paying benefi-
ciaries as to those who do not pay. If the theories discussed 
and discarded by this court in the Silva and England cases 
do not justify immunity from liability in the case of a paying 
beneficiary, there is no logical justification for clinging to 
them in the case of the beneficiary who does not pay. (Mulli-
ner v. Evangelischer Diakonniessenverein, 144 Minn. 392, 397, 
398 [175 N.W. 699] ; Sheehan v. North Country Com. Hospi-
tal, 273 N.Y. 163, 166 [7 N.E.2d 28, 109 A.L.R. 1197] ; Dillon 
v. Rockaway Beach Hospital, 284 N.Y. 176, 180 [30 N.E.2d 
.373] ; Hewett v. Woman's Hospital Aid Assn., 73 N.H. 556, 
564 [64 A.1190, 7 L.R.A.N.S. 496] ; Foster v. Roman Catholic 
Diocese of Vermont, -- Vt. -- [70 A.2d 230, 234-235] ; 
see 28 Cal.L.Rev. 530, 533.) 
"Abolition of the immunity as to the paying patient is 
justified as the last short step but one to extinction. Reten-
tion for the nonpaying patient is the least defensible and 
most unfortunate of the distinction's refinements. He, least 
of all, is able to bear the burden. More than all others, he 
has no choice. He is the last person the donor would wish to 
go without indemnity. With everyone else protected, the 
additional burden of protecting him cannot break the trust. 
He should be the first to have reparation, not last and least 
among those who receive it. So stripped of foundation, the 
distinction falls. I t should fall in line with, not away from, 
the trend which has brought it about. The immunity should 
go and the object of the charity should be placed on a par 
with all others." (Rutledge, J., in President &- Directors of 
Georgetown College \". Hughes, 130 F.2d 810, 827.) 
The Presbytery asserts that this court adopted a dis-
tinction based on payment in Humphreys v. San Francisco 
Area Council, 22 Ca1.2d 436 [139 P.2d 941]. It misconstrues 
that decision. A judgment for defendant was there affirmed 
-) 
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on the ground, not that it was a charity and therefore immune, 
but that the plaintiff had given no compensation for the ride 
he received in the vehicle in which he was injured and was, 
therefore. under Vehicle Code seetion 403, a guest not en-
titled to recover in the absence of wilful misconduct or intoxi-
cation on the part of the driver. This court did not pass upon 
the extent of defendant's liability as a charitable corporation 
for the reason that under section 403 no actionable wrong had 
been committed. (22 Ca1.2d 436, 443-444; see, also, Edwards 
v. HoUt/wood Canteen, 27 Cal.2d 802, 812 [167 P.2d 729}.) 
'rhe Presbytery contends that public policy requires the 
preservation of its immunity from liability for torts com-
mitted by its agents 011 nonpaying beneficiaries of its charity. 
The declared publie policy of this state, however, is contrary 
to that yiew: "Rveryone is responsible, not only for the 
result of his willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to 
another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the management 
of his property or pl'rson. . .. " (Civ. Code, § 1714.) T~at 
policy admits of no exception based upon the objectives. 
however laudable. of the tort feasor. (See, also, Mulliner v. 
Evannelischer Dial:onlllessenverein, 144 Minn. 392, 398 [175 
N.W. 699].) As was said in the Silva case, supra: ., [N]o 
one is obliged by law to assist a stranger, even though he can 
do so by a mere word, and without the slightest danger to 
himself. However, once he has undertaken to render assist-
ance the law imposes upon him a duty of care toward the 
pf'rson assisted. (Restatement of Law of Torts, § 324; 
McLeod v. Rawsun, 215Mass. 257 [102 N.E. 429, 46 L.R.A.N.S. 
;)47] ; Hoyt v. Tilton, 81 N.H. 477 [128 A. 688) .... Profes-
sor Harper, in his book, 'The Law of Torts,' points out that 
'the lmmunity of charitable corporations in tort is based upon 
very dubious rerounds.' Continuing, he concludes: 'It would 
seem that a sound social policy ought, in fact, to require such 
organizations to make just compensation for harm legally 
caused b;v tlJeir activities nnder the same circumstances as 
individual .. before they carry on their charitable activities. 
The> policy of the law requiring individuals to be just before 
gpncrous seems equally applicable to charitable corporations. 
To require an injured !ndividual to forego compensation for 
harm Whe'll he is otherwise entitled thereto, because the injury 
was committed by the servants of a charity, is to require him 
to make an nnreasonablr contribution to the charity, again!!t 
his will, anu u rnle of law imposing' sllch burdens can not be 
regarded as socially desirabJe nor consistent with sound 
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policy.' (Sec. 294.)" (Silva v. Prov~dence Hospital, 14 Cal.2d 
762,775 [97 P.2d 798].) "The incorporated charity should 
respond as do private individuals, business corporations and 
others, when it does good in the wrong way." (President &; 
Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, supra, 130 F.2d 
810,828.) The dictum in Thomas v. German General Benevo-
lent Society, 168 CaL 183, 188 [141 P.1186]. and the decisions 
following it are disapproved. 
[1] It has been suggested that plaintiff in effect paid for 
the services rendered by the Daily Vacation Bible School, 
inasmuch as his parents made contributions for the support 
of the school. These contributions, however, were voluntary 
and anonymous and unlike the scheduled charges for medical 
and hospital care that were paid by the plaintiffs in the Silva 
and England cases. It is not certain, therefore, that plaintiff 
could qualify as a "paying beneficiary" of the charity in this 
case. In any event, a consideration of this question is not 
necessary in view of our decision that charitable corporations 
are liable for their torts whether or not a particular plaintiff 
has paid for the charity received. 
The Presbytery next contends that Antisdale and Fong 
were not agents of the Presbytery. 
[2] The evipence introduced at the trial shows that the 
Presbyterian denomination in this country is an integrated 
ecclesiastical organization. There are four principal levels of 
authority: the General Assembly, the Synods, the Presby-
teries, and the local churches or "Sessions." As the name 
•• Presbyterian" suggests, the Presbytery is a vital unit of 
this organization, and it has extensive powers of control over 
the churches within its jurisdiction. In practice, such power 
is seldom exercised over firmly established, thriving congre-
gations, but there are at least three situations where this 
authority is of great importance: (1) before a local church 
is fully established, missionary activities are conducted by the 
Presbytery; (2) when a church becomes too large, the Pres-
bytery supervises its division into smaller churches and has 
the power to apportion property among them (see Wheelock v. 
First Presbyterian Church of Los Angeles, 119 Cal. 477, 482 
[51 P. 841]) ; (3) in a declining neighborhood, when a church 
is no longer able to function successfully by itself, the Pres-
bytery takes over (see Tabor Presbyterian Church Dissolution 
Case, 347 Pa. 263 [32 A.2d 196]). 
Plaintiff contends that at the time of the accident the 
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San Mateo Presbyterian Church was in the "mission" stage, 
that the Presbytery was therefore directly engaged in pro-
moting Presbyterianism in that area, and that the Daily 
Vacation Bible School was an integral part of this activity by 
the Presbytery. Early in the trial this issue was emphasized 
by comments of the trial court to the jury; the jurors were 
expressly told to look for the degree to which the Presbytery 
conducted the social and recreational activities of the San 
Mateo Church. "In other words, if those matters were left 
to the local church to be solved and were controlled by the 
local organization, then the Presbytery wouldn't be involved." 
The verdict against the Presbytery necessarily involves a 
finding by the jury that these matters were not left to the 
local church. This finding is sufficiently supported by evi-
dence that the San Mateo Church was in an embryonic stage 
at the time of the accident and that, in view of that fact, its 
activities were conducted by the Presbytery. 
The missionary character of the local church is suggested 
by the fact that its property was held by the Presbytery. The 
Presbytery held the lease for the building where the services 
and Bible classes were conducted. The rental on this building 
was nominally paid by the church, but for most of this amount 
it received a monthly subsidy from the War Emergency Fund 
of the national Presbyterian organization. Not until after 
the incorporation of the church in 1945, almost two years after 
the accident, did the Presbytery convey to the church other 
land on which the present edifice is located. The San Mateo 
church did not pay all of Antisdale's salary; it received a 
monthly subsidy for this purpose from the National Board of 
Missions. 
Antisdale himself testified that the church was in an 
embryonic st.age and was considered a mission church. Later, 
following a recess at the trial, he testified t.hat he did not 
know what the technical definition of a mission church is, 
that" I believe it must be one that is solely supported by the 
National Mission Board, and I do not think it could quite 
qualify as that." Whet.her or not. the church was a mis-
sion in a t.echnical ecclesiastical sense, the fact that it was 
considered a mission church attest.s strongly to its embryonic ' 
character and indicat.es that t.here was a close working 
relationship bet.ween the church and the Presbytery. 
The Presbytery had the power to approve or disapprove 
Antisdale's selection as minic:;ter. Following his installation 
in that office by the Presbytery, he was not responsible 
) 
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to the local church but only to the Presbytery. The Presby-
tcry, not the church, had the power to remove him. Further-
more, he could not transfer to another pastorate without th€ 
permission of the Presbytery, and in fact be was a membcr of 
the Presbytery rather than of the local church. 
As the judicatory in charge ")f all Presbyterian churches 
in the San Francisco Bay area, the Presbytery of San 
Francisco had primary responsibility for the extension 
of the Presbyterian movement into new localities in that 
region. It was the Presbytery that organized the San Mateo 
group in 1942 and undertook the task of transforming it into 
a full-fledged church. During this early period, the Pres-
bytery not only held the church property but was in charge 
of church activities. Speaking of churches in the mission 
stage, an officer of the defendant Presbytery testified: "that 
really is the place where the presbytery does exercise control. " 
The establishment and maintenance of religious education for 
children was an important part of the Presbytery's project 
in San Mateo. The jury could properly conclude, therefore, 
that the agents who conducted the Daily Vacation Bible School 
were the agents of the Presbytery. 
It bears emphasis that we are not here called upon to deter. 
mine the liability of the Presbytery for negligence in the 
activities of a fully' established and independently incorpo-
rated Presbyterian church which has passed the mission stage. 
The Presbytery has cited a number of decisions in other 
states to the effect that bishops and similar ecclesiastical 
bodies are not liable for the torts of local ministers. ~one of 
these cases involved supervision of a mission church. Further-
more, some were contract actions and turned upon specific 
findings that the act of the subordinate was beyond his con-
tractual authority(Leahey v. Williams, 141 Mass. 345, 355-
357 [6 N.E. 78] ; Davidsville First National Bank v. St. John's 
Church, 296 Pa. 467, 472 [146 A. 102]), or that an alleged 
agency by estoppel had not been proved (Reifsnyder v. 
Dougherty, 301 Pa. 328, 333-334 [152 A. 98]). In Carini v. 
Beaven, 219 Mass. 117 [106 N.E. 589, L.R.A. 1915B 825], 
the plaintiff did not rely upon the doctrine of respondeat 
superior but alleged the violation of a duty owed directly by 
the defendant bishop; the case turned solely on principles of 
negligence and proximate cause. In Magnuson v. O'Dea, 75 
Wash. 574 [135 P. 640, Ann.Cas. 1915B 1230, 48 L.R.A.N.S. 
327], the appeal did not concern the bishop as a bishop, but 
WI an individual, and involved allegations that he had himself 
-) 
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participated in the tortious conduct. The action of the trial 
court in dismissing the suit as to the bishop in his corporate 
capacity was not discussed on appeal, but it is siJnifiennt that 
under local decisions the doctrine of charitJ\ble immunity was 
applicable. (Richardson v. Carbon Hill Coa.l Co., 10 Wash. 
648, 655 [39 P. 95] ; Tn"bble v. Missionary Sisters of Sacred 
Heart, 137 Wash. 326, 329-330 [242 P. 372].) [8] Oncc 
the claim of charitable immunity is rejected, there is no com-
pelling reason for not applying the rule of rcspondeat superior 
to ecclesiastical bodies as it applies to other employers. jl 
The Presbytery contends that even if Antisdale was en-
gaged in work for the Presbytery, he was an independent 
contractor for whose negligence the Presbytery was not I 
responsible. 
[4] Whether a person performing work for another is ' 
an agent or an independent contractor depends primarily 
upon whether thl:! one for whom the work is done has the 
legal right to control the activities of the alleged agent . ./ 
(Edward.s v. Freeman, 34 Cal.2d 589, 592,593 [212 P.2d 883] ; 
Empire Star Mines Co. v. California Emp. Com., 28 Cal.2d 
33,43 [168 P.2d 686].) [5] The power of the principal to 
terminate the services of the agent gives him the menns of 
controlling the agent's activities. "The right to immediately 
discharge involves the right of control." (Riskin v. 1ndus-
trial Acc. Com., 23 Cal.2d 248, 253, 255 [144 P.2d 16]; 
Ry"n v. Farrell, 208 Cal. 200, 202-203 [280 P. 945] ; Western 
Metal Supply Co. v. Pillsbury, 172 Cal. 407, 417 [156 P. 491, 
Ann.Cas. 1917E 390] ; Chapman v. Edwards, 133 Cal..App. 72, 
77,79 [24 P.2d 211] ; Y1tcaipa Ihr.rmers Cooperative Assn. v. 
Industrial Acc. Com., 55 Cal.App.2d 234, 237 [130 P.2d 
146].) [6] It is not essential that the right of control be 
exercised or that there be actual supervision of the work of 
the agent. The existence of the right of control and super-
vision establishes the existence of an agency relationship. 
(Empire Star Mines Co. v. California Emp. Com., 28 Cal.2d 
33, 43 [168 P.2d 686].) [7] The evidence clearly supports 
the c.onclusion of the jury that such control existed in thE' 
present case. The right of the Presbytery to install and 
remove its ministers, to approve or disapprove their transfer 
to other jurisdictions, and to supervise and control the activ-
ities of the local churches, particularly those in the mission 
sta/!"e, is inconsistent with a contrary conclusion. 
[8] Other tests are sometimes invoked, in addition to the 
power of control, in determining whether one is an agent. 
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They reinforce thc conclusion that Antisdale was an agent 
and not an iudependent contractor. As listed in Empire 
Star Mines Co. v. California Emp. Com., supra, (ct. Rest., 
Agency § 220) they include: "(a) [W]hether or not the one 
performing services is engaged in a distinct occupation or 
business. " Antisdalc was not engaged in an independent 
occupation in the sense that he contracted with different 
churches to perform various pastoral services on a job basis; 
the evidence shows that he was engaged solely in his work with 
thc San Mateo church and that he could accept no other 
assignments as a Presbyterian minister without the consent of 
the Presbytery. "(b) [T)he kind of occupation, with refer-
ence to whether, in the locality, the work is usually done under 
the direction of the principal or by a specialist without super-
vision. " In the locality in question, as well as elsewhere, the 
work of a pastor of a Presbyterian church is subject to 
the same supervision by the Presbytery as outlined above. 
"(c) [T]he skill required in the particular occupation." 
The element of skill is closely linked to the policy con-
siderations that render one free from liability for the acts of 
an independent contractor. A property owner, for example, 
may be unable to understand the intricacies of erecting a 
building upon his Ilaud-the most that he can ordinarily be 
expected to do is to usc care in the selection of a construc-
tion contractor. The Presbytery contends that the services 
here involved were "professional," like those rendered by a 
physician or au attorney, and that as a matter of law a min-
ister should be regarded as an independent contractor. The 
skills possessed by Antisrlale were also possessed by the Pres-
bytery; it was the Presbytery in fact that determined that he 
was qualified for this position, whereas medical, legal, or con-
struction experts are examined and licensed by state authority. 
None of the duties performed by Antisdale were too compli-
cated for efficient supervision by the Presbytery. "(d) 
[W]hether the principal or the workman supplies the instru-
mentalities, tools, and theplnce of work for the person doing 
the work." Although the vehicles used at the time of the 
accidcnt were supplied by Antisdale and Fong, the prin-
cipal instrumentalities of Antisdale's work were the prop-
erty of the employer; for l'xample, the property on which the 
church services and the classes of the Daily Vacation Bible 
School were held was leased for the church by the Presbytery. 
"(e) [T]he length of time for which the services are to be 
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by the Presbytery in 1943; he transferred to the South Holly-
wood Church in 1945. So far as anything in the evidence 
suggests, his employment in San Mateo was on an indefinite 
basis. "(f) [T]he method of payment, whether by the time 
or by the job." Antisdale was paid by the month. "(g) 
[W]hether or not the work is a part of the regular business 
of the principal." All the activities of the church, including 
the Daily Vacation Bible School, revolved around the office of 
the pastor. "(h) [W]hether or not the parties believe they 
are creating the relationship of employer-employee." There 
is no evidence that at the time Antisdale was employed either 
he or the Presbytery gave any thought to the distinction 
between agent and independent contractor. 
[9] Although the evidence as to Antisdale's negligence is 
conflicting, there is substantial evidence to support the finding 
that he was negligent and that his negligence was a cause of 
the injury to plaintiff. Such a finding is supported on either 
of two grounds: (1) that Antisdale negligently permitteti 
and participated in a race between his automobile and the 
station wagon driven by Fong, causing both vehicles to travel 
at an excessive speed, and forcing Fong to enter the inter-
section of Twenty-eighth and Isabelle Avenues on the wrong 
side of the roadway, thus causing the accident; and (2 ) that 
Antisdale was negligent in permitting plaintiff among others 
to ride on the running boards of the vehicles, and that such 
negligence caused the injuries of which plaintiff complains. 
[10] It is clear that Antisdale was acting in the scope of his 
agency at the time the tort was committed. As his principal, 
the Presbytery is liable for injuries to plaintiff resulting 
therefrom. 
The verdict against the Presbytery may be supported 
not only on Antisdale's negligence but on that of Fong as 
well. Civil Code section 2351 provides: "A subagent, law-
fully appointed, represents the principal in like manner with 
the original agent. . .. " Antisdale was an agent of the 
Presbytery, i.e., the "original" agent, and he lawfully 
appointed Fong a subagent. 
[11] An agency relationship may be informally created. 
No particular words are necessary, nor need there be consider-
ation. All that is required is conduct by each party mani-
festing acceptance of a relationship whereby one of them is to 
perform work for the other under the latter's dircction. (See 
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[Ul There is ample evidence to support a finding that 
Antisdaleand Fong entered into just such a relationship. 
Antisdale, as pastor of the church, was in charge of the Vaca-
tion Bible School. It was his responsibility to supcrvise and 
control the instruction and all activities connected with the 
school. He was in charge of the transportation of the chil-
dren from the church to the playground and of their return 
to the church. He had authority to direct the activities of the 
children attending the school and to direct them into vehicles 
for transportation to the playground. He determined how 
.long the children should remain at the playground and when 
they should be returned to the church. 
For three days, while Antisdale was ill, Fong per-
formed these duties for him. Fong was not a mere volunteer 
performing inCidental services for the school; his participa-
tion was essential to the conduct of the school since, in Anti-
dalc's absence, he was the only person available to conduct 
Bible instruction. Fong's performance of duties for which 
Antisdale was responsible did not cease upon the latter's 
return to the school. On the day of the accident, although 
Antisdale had returned to the school, Fong continued to 
conduct the Bible class. Antisdale's own testimony shows 
that when Fon~ released the children for transportation 
to the playground, Antisdale took charge of the movement. 
He directed several of the children to leave Fong's station 
wagon and to get into his own automobile. He allowed the 
other children, including plaintiif, to remain with Fang, 
although he had room for several more children in his own 
automobile. He led the way to the playground, with Fong 
following closely behind. At all times Antisdale had full 
authority over the children in Fong's vehicle as well as in his 
own, and he was responsible for their conduct au(l safcty. 
If Antisdale had had any doubts about Fong's driving ability 
Or responsibility, he could have refused him permission to 
drive the children to the playground. Fong's continued con-
nection with the school was possible only because Antisdale 
gave his consent, and it could have been severed by Antisdale 
at any time. 
[13] The evidence that Fong, with Antisdale's knowledge 
and consent, performed duties for which the latter was 
responsible, that his performance of those duties was subject 
to Antisdale's supervision and control, and that his services 
could be terminated by Antisdale at any time, supp0l1$ the 
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conclusion that Fong was a subagent acting within the !><,ope 
of his agency at the time of the accident. This conclusion is 
not negatived by the fact that Fong was not paid. (Restate-
ment, Agency, § 225; see, also, Graf v. Harvey, 79 Cal.App.2d 
64, 69 [179 P.2d 348] ; Navarro v. Somerfeid. 35 Cal.App.2d 
35, 37-38 [94 P.2d 623] ; 1 Cal.Jur., Agency, 790, § 79.) 
Edwards Y. Freeman. 34 Ca1.2d 589 [212 P.2d 883], does 
not compel a contrary result. In that case, this court held 
that it was an error to permit the jury to find that plaintiff 
was the principal of her son so as to impute his negligence to 
her to bar her recovery for injuries caused by the concurrent 
negligence of her son and the defendant. The defendant 
attempted to justify the submission of the issue to the jury by 
evidence that plaintiff had requested hcr son to drive her to 
town to get her glasses fixed and that the accident occurred in 
the course of that errand. This court held, however, that 
since the undisputed evidence established that plaintiff had 
no authority over her son or legal power to control his activ-
ities, the route he took, or his operation of his automobile, no 
agency relationship existed as a matter of law. There was in 
that case no "affirmative evidence adequate to show that ... 
either the plaintiff was actually exercising control over the 
manner of operation of the car or the relationship of plaintiff 
and her son was such as to give plaintiff a legally cognizable 
right to control or command the son in his operation of the 
machine." (34 Ca1.2d 589, 593.) The decision was based 
on the absence of evidence of plaintiff's right to control her 
son's operation of the automobile in which she rode, and not. 
as Antisdale implies, on the conclusion that, as a matter of 
law, no ag'ency relationship can arisp. out of the performance 
of services as a gratuitous favor. (Cf. Graf v. Harvey, 79 
Cal.App.2d 64, 69 [179 P.2d 348].) It is not applicable to 
the present appeal, in which there is ample evidence that 
Antisdale had the legal right to control and supervise Fong '8 
activities, and to sever his connection with the school at any 
time. 
The evidence shows that Daily Vacation Bible Schools were 
conducted by virtually all churches of the Presbyterian 
denomination, including those within the area governed by 
the Presbytery of San Francisco, and in fact the Daily Vaca-
tion Bible School of the San Mateo church antedated Anti.s-
dale's arrival there. In many respects the organization of 
such schools is similar to that of Sunday Schools and neces-
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minister. Antic;dalc testified that the children were divided 
into age groups and that he gave the Bible instruction to 
those of plaintiff's age and above. There were classes in 
handwork and classes in wOTShip and the superviscd recre-
ation pcriods. Extensive volunteer assistance was custom-
arily rendered by the friends and members of the church. 
Authority to organize the school and its staff was 
inherent in the nature and scope of Antisdale's duties. 
[14] Fong was appointed in the exercise of this authority, 
and therefore, under the provisions of section 2351 of the 
Civil Code, the Presbytery may be held liable for Fong's 
negligence. (Civ. Code § 2349; Malmstrom v. Bridges, 8 Cal. 
App.2d 5, 8 [47 P.2d 336] ; Rice v. Trinity Oounty, 110 Cal. 
247,251 [42 P. 809] ; Seymour v. Oelrichs, 162 Cal. 318, 323 
[122 P. 847] ; Greig v. Riordan, 99 Cal. 316, 322 [33 P. 913] ; 
Daily Telegram v. Ocean View Oil 00., 65 Cal.App. 608, 
611-612 [224 P. 1006]; Julian v. Schwartz, 16 Cal.App.2d 
310,328 [60 P.2d 887] ; Thompson v. Gibb, 1 Cal.Unrcp. 173, 
183-184; 2 Am.Jur [Agcncy] 145, 156-159, §§ 180, 197-199. 
See, also, Bank of Oalifornia v. Western Union Telegraph 00., 
1)2 Cal. 280, 289; Gates v. Daley, 54 Cal.App. 654, 655-656 
[202 P. 467J; Hollidge v. Duncan, 199 Mass. 121, 123 [85 
N.E. 186]; Oampbell v. Trimble, 75 Tex. 270, 271-272 [12 
S.W. 863] ; Mechem, The Liabt1ity of a Master for the Negli-
gence of a Stranger Assi.sting His Servant, 3 Mich.L.Rev. 198; 
13L.R.A. [N.S.] 572; 45 L.R.A. [N.S.] 382.) 
[15] The Presbytery next contends that the corporation 
that is a defendant in this suit is not the same as the religious 
entity that supervises the Presbyterian ministers and churches 
of the San Francisco area. It is elaimed that the defendant 
corporation was organized solely to hold property of the local 
Presbyterian groups and is not "an operating agency of the 
church. " The articles of incorporation of the defendant 
show an int(>ntion to incorporate the Presbytery as such-the 
preamble states that "the religious association heretofore and 
now knoWll as and called the Prcsbytcry of San Francisco 
. . . is hereby incorporated. . . ." The purpose clause, more-
over, e,inces no such limitcd objective as is now claimed. The 
exprcss purposes include: ,. to promote, maintain and sURtain 
in whole or in part, religious services in Presbyterian churches 
and missions," "to strengthcn and extend the work and 
interests of the Gcncral Assembly of the Presbyterian church 
in the Unit(>d States of America," and "to carryon any ot]wr 
business, and to exercise any other powers which may be 
) 
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nec('ssary, proper or convenient to be carried on or exercised 
in cqnnectioll with any of the foregoing purposes or incident 
thereto." '!'he Pr(>sbytery's supervision of the religious activ-
itie!; of The SIlIJ Mateo Church is included within the broad 
scope of thi~ language, which is simply a statement of the 
total purposes of the Presbytery before as well as after the 
incorporation. 
Plal1ltiff's Appeal from the Order Granting a New Trial 
[16] After the denial of his motion for judgment not-
withstanding the verdict, Antisdale moved for a new trial on 
all statutory grounds. His motion was granted, but the 
court's order specified no ground upon which it was made. 
Since insufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict was 
not specified, it must be assumeo that the order granting the 
motion was not based on that gronnd. (Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 657; Adams v. American President Lines, Ltd., 23 Cal.2d 
681, 683 [146 P.2d IJ.) oJ' 
In support of the motion for new trial, Antisdale contends 
that the trial court improperly instructed the jury that they 
might determine as a question of fact whether plaintiff was a 
guest or a passenger· in Fong's station wagon, whereas, he 
claims. plaintiff was a guest as a matter -of law and a -verdict 
against Fong, and Antisdale as Fong's principal, could not 
therefore rest on a finding that Fong failed to use ordinary 
care for plaintiff's safety. He contends that, since the evi-
dence discloses that Fong performed his services gratuitously 
and DO compensation was paid for plaintiff's ride to the play-
ground, the only permissible finding is that plaintiff was a 
guest in the station wagon. Plaintiff contends that there is 
substantial evidence to support the infe:.'ence that compensa-
tion was paid for the ride within the meaning of section 403 
and that it was therefore proper to submit the question to the 
jury. 
[17] It is immaterial that Fong performed the services 
gratuitously: he performed those services as the agent of the 
Presbytery in discharging Antisdale's duty to transport the; 
children to the playground for their recreation period. It is 
sufficient therefore if Antisdale, the church, or the Presbytery 
.,' ~ 0 person who as a guest accepts a ride in any vehicle upon a high· 
way mthout giving compensation for such ride, nor any other person, has 
any rig-ht of action for civil damages against the driver of BUch vehicle 
or against any other person legally liable for the Mnduct of such driver 
on account of personal injury to or the death of Buch guest during such 
ride, unless the plaintiff in any Buch action establishes that Bueh injUl'1 
or death proximately resulted from the intoxication or wilful m.i.8conduct 
ef eaid driver." (Veh. Code, j 403.) 
) 
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received a benefit from the transportation of plaintiff to the 
playground. 
[18] The transportation of plaintiff to the playground for 
the recreation period was not an isolated transaction; it was 
an integral part of the conduct of the Bible school as one 01 
the normal activities of the San Mateo Presbyterian Church. 
It is undisputed that the attendance of the children at the 
Bible school was at It'ast of mutual benefit to the children and 
the church. The conduct of such schools was authorized by 
the church laws, and it was to the interest of the church and 
the Presbytery that parents send their children to the school. 
Antisdalt' had a large number of handbills printed urging 
attendance at the school. The children had recently been 
releMed from secular schools for their summer vacation, and 
many parents wanted their children to spend the time in the 
open air. It is not an unreasonable inft'rence that the daily 
open-air recreation periods were designed to induce these 
parents to send their children to the school and did induce 
them to do so. Such an inference negatives the theory that no 
compensation was given for the transportation to such recre-
ation periods. "[B]enefits or considerations other than cash 
or its equivalent may be 'compensation.' ... " (Humphreys 
v.San Fran~co Area Council, 22 Cal.2d 436, 442 [139 P.2d 
941]; California Cas. Indem. Exchange v. Industrial Ace. 
Com., 21 Ca1.2d 461, 464 [132 P.2d 815] ; Darling v. Dream-
land Bedding &: Upholstering Co., 44 Cal.App.2d 253, 257 
{112 P.2d 338] ; Piercy v. Zeiss, 8 Cal.App.2d 595, 598 [47 
P.2d 818] ; Crawford v. Foster, 110 Cal.App. 81, 84 [293 P. 
841].) 
The Bible school was an integral part of the activities of the 
church, and the recreation period an integral part of the Bible 
school. The conduct of the school was in part financed by 
the general funds of the church. In addition, the evidence 
discloses that contributions were solicited from the parents of 
children attending the school "to defray the expenses inci-
dental to the running of the school." Antisdale testified that 
contributions were solicited weekly by giving the children 
envelopes to take home for the enclosure of contributions from 
their parents. Plaintiff testified that his parents made contri. 
butions therefor; 
[19] It is clear therefore that plaintiff attended a Bible 
school financed in part by parents' contributions to the church 
and by their payments to "defray thE' expenses incidental to 
the running of the school." Plaintiff's status is analogous to 
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that of a student at a public school wh() is given free school 
bus service and who is considered :l passcng-cr in the bus by 
virtue of his parents' contribution to school expenSl'S by the 
payment of taxes. (Smith v. Fall River Joint Union High 
School District, 118 Cal.App. 673, 679 [5 P.2d 930] ; sec, also, 
Shannon v. Central-Gaither Union School District, 133 Cal. 
App. 124,128 [23 P.2d 769].) It may reasonably be inferred 
from this evidence that compensation was given for plaintiff's 
ride within the meaning of section 403. (Kruzie v. Sanders, 
23 Cal.2d 237, 242 [143 P.2d 704] ; Druzanich v. Criley, 19 
Ca1.2d 439, 443 [122 P.2d 531; Swink v. Gardena Club, 65 
Cal.App.2d 674, 677-678 [151 P.2d 313]; Carey v. City of 
Oakland, 44 Cal.App.2d 503, 507-509 [112 P.2d 714] ; Boyson 
v. Porter, 10 Cal.App.2d 431, 436 [52 P.2d 582].) 
Humphreys v. San Francisco Area Council, 22 Ca1.2d 436 
[139 P.2d 941], is not in point. In that case, this court 
affirmed a judgment for defendant on the trial court's finding 
that plaintiff was in fact a guest. It was sp.!Xlmcally recog--
nizcd that a finding that he was a passenger in the vehicle 
would also be supported by the evidence, and that the resolu-
tion of conflicting evidence was for the trier of fact. 
Antisdale next contends that it was improper for the trial 
court to instruct the jury that they might find him to be 
Fong's principal and therefore liable for Fong's negligence. 
We have already discussed the relationships between the 
Presbytery and Antisdale and between the Presbytery and 
Fong, and we have accepted plaintiff's contention that both 
Antisdale and Fong were agents of the Presbytery. Antis-
dale expressly adopts this contention and relies in addition 
on Civil Code section 2351, which provides: "A subagent, 
lawfully appointed, represents the principal in like manner 
with the original agent; and the original agent is not respon-
sible to third persons for the acts of the subagent." 
[20] The doctrine of respondeat superior is not applicable 
to the relationship between a supervisor and his subordinate 
employees. The supervisor occupies an economic and legal 
position quite different from that of the employer. It is not 
the supervisor's work that is being performed, nor does he 
share in the profits which the employees' conduct is designed 
to produce. In the usual situation, furthermore, he, like his 
subordinates, is a wage earner, and he is seldom able to 
respond in damages to an appreciably greater extent than 
they. For these reasons, the law has shifted financial rf'spon· 
sibility frOlD the supl:rvisor, who exercises immediate control, 
) 
June 1951] MALLOY tJ. FONG 
[37 C.2d 356; 231 P .2d 241) 
379 
to the employer, who exercises ultimate control and for whose 
benefit the work is done. (Bank of Oalifornia v. Western 
Un'ion Telegraph 00., 52 Cal. 280, 288-292.) Section 2351 of 
the Civil Code codifies this principle and has been uniformly 
interpreted to exempt superior employees from vicarious 
liability to third persons for the tortious conduct of sub-
ordinates. (Hilton v. Oliver, 204 Cal. 535, 539 [269 P. 425, 
61 A.L.R. 297] ; Handley v. Lombardi, 122 Cal.App. 22, 29 
[9 P.2d 867] ; Barton v. McDermott, 108 Cal. App. 372, 384 
[291 P. 591] ; Los Angeles v. l,os Angeles Pacific Navigation 
00., 84 Cal.App. 413, 419 [258 P. 409]. See, also, Restate-
ment, Agency, section 358 (1) ; Ellis v. Southern Rat'lway 00., 
72 S.C. 465, 473 [52 S.E. 228, 2 L.R.A.N.S. 378] ; 61 A.L.R. 
290.) [21] It was therefore error to instruct the jury that 
they might find Antisdale liable for Fong's negligence. 
[22] Since there was a substantial conflict in the evidence 
as to whether Antisdale himself was negligent, it cannot be 
determined whether the jury based its verdict against Antis-
dale on that ground or on the erroneous agency instructions 
that he could be found liable for Fong's negligence. Under 
these circumstances it was proper for the trial court to grant 
the motIon for new trial. (Mazzotta v. Los Angeles Ry. Oorp., 
2:) Oal.2d 165, 169, 170-171 [153 P.2d 338] ; Bieser v. Dom'es, 
119 Cal.App. 659, 663 [7 P.2d 388] ; Middleton v. Oaliforma 
j~treet Oable Railway 00., 73 Cal.,App.2d 641, 646-647 [167 
P.2d 239] ; see, also, Oettinger v. Stewart, 24 Cal.2d 133, 140 
1148 P.2d 19, 156 A.L.R. 1221].) This determination does 
not affect the Presbytery, for it is clearly liable for Fon~'s 
negligence whether or not the jury based its verdict against 
Antisdale on the ground that Antisdale was negligent. 
The judgment in favor of the Presbytery of San Francisco 
is reversed, and the trial court is directed to enter a judgment 
against the Presbytery in accord:mce with the verdict of the 
jury. The order granting a new trial as to Antisdale is 
affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., and Spence, J., 
concurred. 
SCHAUER, J.-I concur in the judgment. In so doing I 
think it proper to note, however, that in my view1 Fong was 8 
1:Por the rC.'l .. ~ons and upon the grounds more fully discussed in thE 
opinion prepared by Mr. Justice 600dcll fOT tht> District l;Ourt of App<>ul. 
First Appellate District, Di\'ision Two, wllil'h discussion appears at pages 
ti2·53 of tho opinion as reported in 220 P.2d 48. 
) 
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mere volunteer over whose conduct neither Antisdale nor the 
Presbytery had any authority or right to exercise control and 
whose negligence cannot be related to tbem on the theory of 
respondeat superior. It would follow that the judgment to be 
entered against the Presbytery as directed by the majority 
should not stand as against a motion for new trial or an 
appeal (see Lauritsen v. Goldsmith (1929), 99 Cal.App 671, 
676 [279 P. 168] ; Ferran v. Mulcrevy (1935), 9 Cal.App.2d 
129, 131-133 [48 P.2d 948] ; Sutherland v. Palme (1949), 93 
Cal.App.2d 307, 314-315 [208 P.2d 1035] ; Fortier Trans. Co. 
v. Union Packing Co. (1950), 96 Cal.App.2d 748, 756-757 
[216 P.2d 470]), for the same reasons which the majority bold 
require a new trial as to Antisdale. i.e., liability of the Pres-
bytery turns upon liability of Antisdale, and if a new trial is 
proper as to the latter it is likewise required as to the 
Presbytery. 
Shenk, J., concurred. 
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied June 28, 
1951. Shenk, J., and Schauer, J., voted for a rehearing. 
